Asia’s Energy Security: Hormuz Vulnerability & the Clean Energy Imperative

Asia’s profound reliance on oil and gas supplies from the Middle East, coupled with a slower-than-optimal transition to clean energy sources, exposes its leading economies to significant geopolitical and economic vulnerabilities. The Strait of Hormuz, a crucial maritime chokepoint through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments pass, represents a particularly precarious segment of this energy supply chain. Recent geopolitical tensions in the region further underscore this fragility, emphasizing the urgent need for a robust and accelerated shift towards diversified, domestic, and renewable energy sources to ensure long-term stability and security.

Four major Asian nations—China, India, Japan, and South Korea—collectively account for 75% of these vital energy imports. Analysis by research group Zero Carbon Analytics indicates that Japan and South Korea are particularly susceptible to supply disruptions, while India and China also face substantial risks. This heightened vulnerability directly stems from their continued dependence on fossil fuels and insufficient progress in scaling up renewable energy adoption. For instance, in 2023, renewables constituted a mere 9% of South Korea’s power mix, significantly below the 33% average among other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members. Similarly, Japan demonstrated the highest reliance on fossil fuels among Group of Seven (G7) nations in the same year.

Disparities in Energy Security Posture

While China and India represent the largest absolute buyers of oil and LNG traversing the Strait of Hormuz, Japan and South Korea contend with disproportionately higher energy security risks. Japan imports 87% of its total energy from fossil fuels, and South Korea relies on imports for 81%. In contrast, China’s dependence on imported fossil fuels stands at 20%, and India’s at 35%, according to Ember, an independent global energy think tank. The sheer volume of energy passing through the Strait further exacerbates this risk: three-quarters of Japan’s oil imports and over 70% of South Korea’s oil imports—along with a fifth of its LNG—transit this narrow waterway, as noted by Sam Reynolds of the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. Despite these evident risks, both nations have historically prioritized diversifying fossil fuel sources over an aggressive shift to clean energy alternatives.

Japan’s energy policy remains notably inconsistent. It continues to project that 30-40% of its energy will originate from fossil fuels by 2040, alongside ongoing investments in new LNG plants and overseas oil and gas projects. Regulatory hurdles impede the development of offshore wind power, and despite stated climate goals, concrete deadlines for power industry emissions reductions are conspicuously absent. South Korea faces its own set of challenges, with low electricity rates hindering the profitability and, consequently, investment in solar and wind projects—a “key factor” limiting renewables, according to Kwanghee Yeom of Agora Energiewende. To meet their ambitious 2050 net-zero carbon emissions targets, both countries face a formidable task: adding approximately 9 gigawatts of solar power annually through 2030, with Japan also requiring an additional 5 gigawatts of wind and South Korea approximately 6 gigawatts per year.

Progress and Persistent Challenges in China and India

China and India have demonstrated more proactive measures aimed at mitigating global energy price volatility and trade disruptions. China led global growth in wind and solar generating capacity in 2024, with increases of 45% and 18% respectively. It has also bolstered domestic gas output, effectively reducing LNG imports. Despite these considerable efforts, China remains the world’s largest oil importer, with roughly half of its over 11 million barrels per day originating from the Middle East.

India, while heavily reliant on coal and planning a 42% increase in coal production by 2030, has simultaneously experienced faster growth in renewables, adding 30 gigawatts of clean power last year. Diversification of oil suppliers, including increased imports from the United States and Russia, has somewhat ameliorated its immediate risk. However, as Vibhuti Garg of the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis emphasizes, “India still needs a huge push on renewables if it wants to be truly energy secure.”

Broader Regional Implications and Strategic Imperatives

The potential for disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz extends beyond the primary importers, posing risks for the wider Asian region. Southeast Asia, for instance, has transitioned to a net oil importer as demand outstrips domestic supply in nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia. While the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) currently exports more LNG than it imports, rising demand forecasts suggest the region will become a net LNG importer by 2032, according to consulting firm Wood Mackenzie. This trend is compounded by faltering oil and gas production as older fields deplete, while renewable energy adoption struggles to keep pace with escalating demand.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has issued a stern warning that ASEAN’s oil import costs could surge from $130 billion in 2024 to over $200 billion by 2050 if more robust clean energy policies are not enacted. This significant financial burden, coupled with the inherent volatility of imported fossil fuels, underscores that the transition to clean energy is not merely an environmental imperative but a crucial component of national energy security and economic stability. The recent movements in Brent crude oil prices, reflecting market sensitivity to geopolitical events, serve as a tangible reminder of the ongoing strategic challenge for Asia’s energy future.